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ABSTRACT
This Article considers the equal protection “class-of-one” doctrine
in light of recent developments, both at the Supreme Court and in the
lower courts. After Part I explains the background and current state
of the doctrine, Part II considers how that doctrine provides insights
into such basic equal protection concepts as discriminatory intent
and animus. It also critiques the Court’s analysis of the class-of-one,
arguing that the Court has mishandled these concepts and in so
doing caused doctrinal anomalies and lower court confusion. Part II
offers an alternative approach to the class-of-one that corrects those
problems while still addressing the concerns that may have influ-
enced the Court to embrace its mistaken analysis.
Part III considers how the Supreme Court’s mishandling of the
class-of-one risks infecting other areas of equal protection law and
American constitutionalism more generally. It explains how the
Court’s approach threatens the core constitutional commitment that
government action must seek to promote a public purpose. It also
discusses a subsequent Court decision that cites its most recent class-
of-one case in a way that aggravates that threat. The Article
concludes by calling on the Court to reconsider both its aggressive
reading of its class-of-one jurisprudence and the direction of that
jurisprudence itself, in order to reverse the doctrinal and conceptual
damage it has caused. The Article thus demonstrates that the class-
of-one provides insight into larger equal protection issues. At the
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Gewirtzman, Arthur Leonard, H. Jefferson Powell, and participants at Loyola University’s
Constitutional Law Colloquium and a workshop at New York Law School for helpful
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same time, it risks infecting those larger issues with the mistakes
flowing from the Court’s mishandling of this under-studied and
poorly understood doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
As anyone who has ever worked a crossword puzzle knows, a
difficult problem can sometimes be solved by approaching it from a
different angle. An impenetrable “across” clue can become compre-
hensible with the help of a “down” answer. So too with constitu-
tional law. Fundamental questions about equal protection law—the
appropriateness and role of the intent requirement,1 the role of
animus,2 the puzzle of rational basis review,3 the level of judicial
under enforcement,4 and the implications of the Court’s insistence
that equal protection rights are “personal”5—have generated
volumes of scholarship without definitively clarifying these issues.
This Article considers how those debates can be enriched and their
underlying issues clarified by improving our understanding of a
rarely-studied corner of equal protection: the class-of-one.
The class-of-one theory holds that a plaintiff can bring an equal
protection claim alleging discrimination against her in her capacity
as an individual. This theory contrasts with equal protection’s
standard template, in which a plaintiff claims unconstitutional
discrimination based on her group status—as a member of a
particular racial group, or her sex, or some affinity or social group
status. Class-of-one claims are hard to win. Unlike claims based, for
example, on racial discrimination, class-of-one claims succeed only
1. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (explaining and critiquing the intent
requirement in equal protection law).
2. See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887
(2012) (attempting to synthesize the Supreme Court’s understanding of the concept of
animus).
3. See, e.g., id. at 898-900 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rational basis cases); H.
Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law, 86 U. WASH. L. REV. 217, 245-53 (2011) (discussing rationality review);
see also William D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond
the Rules, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 889, 897-98 (2011) (discussing Justice Stevens’s approach to
rationality review).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing the underenforcement issue).
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Affirmative Action and the “Individual” Right to Equal
Protection, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 241 (2009) (discussing this characterization of equal protection
rights).
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if the plaintiff proves that the government’s singling-out lacked a
rational basis. But as a conceptual matter, such claims obtained the
Supreme Court’s unanimous endorsement in the 2000 case of
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.6 Indeed, the Court appeared to
think the matter was uncontroversial; Olech was a short7 per
curiam8 opinion with only one concurring justice embracing an
alternative, more limited, version of the theory.9
Despite Olech’s sanguine view about the theory’s bona fides, the
class-of-one concept remains a doctrinal anomaly. It is far removed
from both the Equal Protection Clause’s preeminent concern with
race10 and discrimination against other groups whose status can be
analogized, with more or less precision, to that of freed slaves after
the Civil War.11 Indeed, as a branch of equal protection that, by
definition, does not focus on discrimination against members of
groups, it fits uneasily with both the anti-classification12 and anti-
subordination13 theories that comprise modern doctrinal and
scholarly understandings of equal protection.14 Moreover, the class-
of-one’s focus on individualized discrimination demands consider-
able intellectual dexterity to locate it within the debate about the
6. 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
7. The opinion for the Court comprised fewer than five pages in the U.S. Reports. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1872) (expressing doubt that the
Equal Protection Clause would ever be used in a context other than racial discrimination).
11. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(analogizing the situation facing women with that facing African-Americans as support for
its conclusion that sex discrimination merited heightened judicial scrutiny); see also MICHAEL
J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 121-22
(1999) (arguing that sex discrimination often reflects the same view of the targeted group’s
lack of full humanity as discrimination against African-Americans).
12. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1949) (giving a classic statement of the anti-classification
understanding of equal protection).
13. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (explaining the anti-subordination theory and explaining
her view that it is superior to the anti-classification theory).
14. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection
Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 493, 494-95 (2007) (explaining the difficulty of superimposing class-
of-one claims on the standard anti-classification template of equal protection).
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role of discriminatory intent, which, along with a group focus, is the
other major organizing principle of standard equal protection law.15
Thus, the class-of-one seems to be a doctrinal outlier. Yet it is also
deeply resonant of fundamental equal protection principles. Most
intuitively, it reflects the Supreme Court’s insistence that equal
protection rights are “personal” rights.16 After all, what could be
more personal than a right to be free from discrimination, not based
on your status as an African-American,17 a woman,18 or a disabled
person,19 but simply for being you? Moreover, despite the seeming
incongruence of the terminology, the class-of-one theory can claim
at least some provenance as the modern manifestation of what is
often thought to be the antebellum precursor to the equal protection
principle: the right to be free from so-called “class legislation”20
favoring21 particular corporations22 or individuals.23
For these reasons the class-of-one concept has a strong intuitive
claim to doctrinal legitimacy, even if it does not follow equal
15. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (imposing the intent requirement).
For classic analyses and critiques of the intent requirement, see Paul Brest, In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 1, at 318.
16. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742-
43 (2007) (referring to equal protection rights as “personal” rights); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (same); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(referring to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as “personal”).
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954) (striking down segregation
of African-American schoolchildren).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down discrimination
against women).
19. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985) (striking
down discrimination against mentally retarded people).
20. See, e.g., Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,
96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 245-48 (1997) (discussing the role of class legislation in the development
of equal protection doctrine). 
21. Because such laws often singled out individuals for benefits rather than burdens, the
analogy is imperfect. But the objections to such laws—that they inappropriately singled out
individuals—applies equally to claims of burdensome singling out as to singling out for
benefits.
22. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970, at 30-37 (2004) (explaining Jacksonian-era
critiques of corporations as founded on the special treatment implicit in the practice of
legislatures granting corporations special charters).
23. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 20, at 245-48; see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (discussing the class legislation concept as a matter of Fourteenth
Amendment law during the Lochner era).
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protection’s traditional path. If so, then perhaps like a crossword’s
“down” answer that solves an otherwise impenetrable “across” clue,
the class-of-one may illuminate thus far elusive answers to funda-
mental questions about equal protection.
But the class-of-one doctrine can play that helpful role only if the
Court gets it right. So far its record is disheartening. After a sloppy
start in Olech, the Court over corrected in Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture, its only other class-of-one opinion to
date.24 The result has been extensive confusion in the lower courts.
Emblematic of such confusion, although by no means its only
example, was the severe split in the Seventh Circuit’s 2012 en banc
decision in Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corporation.25 In Del
Marcelle, the court—in many ways the incubator of the class-of-one
doctrine26—split badly on the best approach to the class-of-one in
the wake of Supreme Court precedent.27 As this Article explains,
this confusion is due largely to the confusing, troubling, and
counterintuitive signals the Court has sent.
Thus, the Supreme Court continues to flunk the class-of-one. As
intrinsically unfortunate as that fact is, its inadequate performance
also causes the Court, more seriously, to fail equal protection—not
in the sense of flunking it, but in the deeper sense of disserving its
core principles. This failure is especially troubling because, like rips
in actual fabric, rips in doctrinal fabric have a way of expanding
from obscure locations to more prominent ones. This Article reveals
the tear the Court’s class-of-one jurisprudence has created in the
fabric of equal protection law. It also explains how a subsequent
Court opinion citing Engquist expands that tear into more promi-
nent locations, threatening core constitutional principles.28
Stated more positively, a more careful analysis of the issues
raised by the class-of-one doctrine would help reinforce core equal
protection principles. That help is needed now more than ever: the
24. 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
25. 680 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
26. See infra Part I; see also Engelbrecht v. Clackamas Cnty., No. CV05-665-PK, 2006 WL
2927244, at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2006) (describing a 1982 Seventh Circuit case, Ciechon v. City
of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), as “the flagship case for ‘class-of-one’ equal protection
claims”).
27. Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 889 (noting the court’s inability to agree).
28. See infra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
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Court’s seeming abandonment of Carolene-style political process
review29 has left it adrift, deciding equal protection cases in an
unsatisfying, ad hoc manner. The Court could begin placing its
equal protection doctrine on a firmer footing by engaging more
seriously with the class-of-one doctrine. This Article calls for such
an engagement.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes the
history and current state of the class-of-one doctrine. Part II
explains how Olech and Engquist, the Supreme Court’s two class-of-
one decisions, mishandled basic concepts of equal protection law,
most notably the intent requirement and equal protection’s core
prohibition against animus-based government action. This poor
performance has created both doctrinal anomalies and lower court
confusion. Part II offers a better methodology, which corrects these
problems while still resolving the practical concerns that may have
influenced the Court to embrace its mistaken approach.
Part III expands the Article’s scope by arguing that the Court’s
sloppy work has begun to infect broader equal protection doctrine.
By appearing to permit government action motivated by animus or
other illegitimate purposes, the Court’s most recent analysis of the
class-of-one doctrine in Engquist threatens the core constitutional
principle that, at a minimum, government action must seek to
promote a public purpose. As such, the Court’s approach to the
class-of-one doctrine threatens basic assumptions of American
constitutionalism. Indeed, in an ominous development the Court has
cited Engquist in a way that expands that threat. Part III concludes
the Article by considering the significance of that latest develop-
ment. It calls on the Court to reconsider both its aggressive reading
of Engquist and its analysis in that case itself, in order to reverse
the doctrinal and conceptual damage it has caused and prevent
further damage. If nothing else, this Article demonstrates that this
seemingly small doctrine merits more careful scrutiny than it
receives, both from scholars and the Court itself.
29. See infra note 202 (demonstrating that abandonment).
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CLASS-OF-ONE
At the Supreme Court, the class-of-one doctrine dates to 2000,
when the Court decided Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.30 But lower
courts had acknowledged and applied the doctrine for at least the
preceding two decades.31 Pre-Olech lower court decisions confronted
some of the basic questions posed by the doctrine, even if their
resolutions had to be adjusted to account for the Supreme Court’s
seemingly offhand opinion in Olech. Because of the importance of
the Supreme Court’s entry into this area, this Part begins the class-
of-one story with Olech and brings in pre-Olech case law as needed
to address the subsequent evolution of the class-of-one doctrine.
A. Olech
As with many class-of-one claims,32 Olech concerned a local spat.
The Olechs, homeowners in the Village of Willowbrook, Illinois,
sought to have their home hooked up to the municipal water
supply.33 Village officials agreed but, allegedly in retaliation for the
Olechs’ successful prosecution of an unrelated lawsuit against the
city, they insisted that the Olechs give up a significantly larger
easement than the Village normally required for such hookups.34
The Olechs sued, alleging that they were the victims of discrimina-
tion, not based on their membership in any group or possession of
any status trait, but rather, as a class-of-one.35 The district court
dismissed the claim, concluding that the complaint did not allege
the level of “ill will” required by Seventh Circuit case law.36 The
30. 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 1982); LeClair v.
Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012) (considering
a class-of-one claim in the context of a marital conflict); Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d
1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering a class-of-one claim in the context of a feud between
neighbors).
33. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563-64.
36. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, No. 97C4935, 1998 WL 196455, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13,
1998).
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Seventh Circuit, relying on its relatively long and developed class-
of-one jurisprudence, reversed, holding such claims did not require
the official “orchestration” the district court had understood that
case law to require.37 
Nevertheless, the appellate court, speaking through Judge
Posner, expressed sympathy with the district court’s concern that a
more plaintiff-friendly standard would “turn[] every squabble over
municipal services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of
thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case.”38 But the
court noted that its precedent did in fact require that the plaintiff
prove animus—not just the level of animus the district court had
understood to be required.39 It also noted that animus was a “but-
for” requirement; Judge Posner explained that the lawsuit would
fail, even assuming animus, if the government-defendant would
have taken the same action in the absence of that animus.40
The Supreme Court affirmed, in a very short per curiam opinion
that endorsed a much broader reading of the class-of-one than the
Seventh Circuit’s.41 Relying on two corporate taxation cases, one
from 1923 and a more recent one notable for its muscular but
controversial use of rational basis review, the Court stated that it
had “recognized” successful class-of-one cases in the past.42 The
Court then described equal protection’s purpose as protection
against “intentional and arbitrary” discrimination.43 Because the
Olechs had alleged such discrimination, the Court held that they
37. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
38. Id. at 388.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
42. Id. at 564 (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S.
336 (1989); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441 (1923)). Sioux City focused
on the remedy for a successful unequal taxation claim. 260 U.S. at 446. Allegheny Pittsburgh
used rational basis review to find a violation of equal protection when a corporation’s property
was assessed based on a valuation theory not provided for by the state constitution, with the
result that its property was subject to higher taxes. 488 U.S. at 343. Justice Thomas later
criticized the implicit conclusion that an administrator’s misapplication of state law and
consequent unequal treatment violated equal protection. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 27-
28 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing Allegheny Pittsburgh on this ground and calling
for its overruling).
43. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
2013] FLUNKING THE CLASS-OF-ONE 445
had adequately stated an equal protection claim, “quite apart from
the Village’s subjective motivation.”44
Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment.45 Like Judge
Posner, he expressed concern about the breadth of a rule allowing
plaintiffs to state class-of-one claims without alleging that govern-
ment officials had harbored animus against the plaintiff.46 Again
like Judge Posner, he feared that such a rule “would transform
many ordinary violations of city or state law into violations of the
Constitution.”47 Nevertheless, he concurred in the judgment,
because the Olechs, in addition to alleging “intentional and arbi-
trary” discrimination, had also alleged the requisite animus that
both he and Judge Posner believed would cabin the reach of the
class-of-one theory.48
B. Olech in the Lower Courts
Olech’s explicit rejection of subjective motivation as a necessary
component of class-of-one claims forced lower courts to consider how
best to rein in the expansive litigation possibilities opened by the
Court’s approach. Some courts responded by heightening pleading
requirements, requiring plaintiffs to plead facts either establishing
the existence of similarly-situated persons49 or negating any possible
rational basis for the differential treatment.50 Other courts raised
the ultimate standard for similar-situatedness, for example, by
requiring that the similarity be “extremely high.”51
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 565-66.
49. See William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the
Equal Protection Class of One and What it Means for Congressional Power to Enforce
Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 50 n.143 (2009) (collecting cases).
50. See id. at 50 n.144 (citing Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.
1992)).
51. Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Araiza, supra note
49, at 51-52 (discussing additional cases). Scholars have noted that in other discrimination
contexts courts have also imposed stringent comparator requirements. See, e.g., Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 753-55 (2011) (noting the
stringency with which courts have imposed this requirement in statutory employment
discrimination claims). Nevertheless, courts have stated that class-of-one claims require
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Perhaps surprisingly, other courts continued to insist on
animus.52 First appearances notwithstanding, such cases may not
reflect as shocking a defiance as one might think of what is at least
explicit Supreme Court dicta.53 In at least some of these cases, one
can understand this continued insistence as reflecting courts’ use of
animus as an evidentiary factor tending to prove the existence of the
“intentional and arbitrary”54 discrimination the Olech Court
identified as equal protection’s fundamental requirement. Neverthe-
less, it remains uncontestable that these courts were at the very
least expressing their unease at the Supreme Court’s cavalier
disregard of that limiting principle. And in some cases, they may in
fact have been talking back to the Court.55
C. Engquist
The lower court reaction to Olech made it clear that at least some
judges favored limits on expansive class-of-one liability.56 The
Court’s second, and to date final, foray into the class-of-one
suggested that the Court had absorbed this lesson—perhaps too
well.
Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture concerned a class-
of-one claim brought by Anup Engquist, an employee of the
defendant state agency.57 After the agency fired her, Ms. Engquist
sued, alleging, among other things, that she constituted a class-of-
one that had been subjected to irrational discrimination motivated
application of an especially stringent similarity requirement. See, e.g., Clubside, 468 F.3d at
159 (noting that, at the summary judgment phase, the relatedness requirement for a class-of-
one claim is more stringent than that in an employment claim); Lindquist v. City of Pasadena,
656 F. Supp. 2d 662, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (reiterating the Clubside standard); see also Willis
v. Town of Marshall, No. 1:02CV127, 2007 WL 1100836, at *10 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2007)
(same).
52. See Araiza, supra note 49, at 53.
53. See id. (suggesting that this insistence may not constitute such lower court defiance).
54. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
55. See, e.g., Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner,
J.) (expressing mystification as to why the Olech Court had dismissed the animus
requirement so off-handedly).
56. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
57. 553 U.S. 591, 595 (2008).
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by animus.58 A jury found for her on this claim,59 but a divided
Ninth Circuit panel reversed that verdict, holding that the class-of-
one doctrine was inappropriate in the government employment
context.60
By a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court agreed.61 Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts attempted to harmonize the
Court’s exclusion of employment claims from class-of-one liability
with its expansive opinion in Olech. He explained that Olech had
featured a “clear standard”—the normal easement size the Village
required for water hookups—the deviation from which triggered
equal protection scrutiny via the rational basis standard.62 By
contrast, he identified other “forms”63 of government action, “which
by their nature involve discretionary decision making based on a
vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.”64
At this point, Chief Justice Roberts could have dispensed with
many class-of-one employment claims—and, indeed, many class-of-
one claims more generally—simply by observing that claims
challenging such “subjective, individualized assessments” would
normally fail to feature either the requisite similar-situatedness or
irrationality. If such decisions—for example, to choose one employee
over another for a budget-mandated layoff—turned on assessments
of the nuanced, individualized collages of each employee’s
employment-relevant characteristics, then presumably the fired
worker would face an exceptionally difficult time proving that a
similarly situated comparator existed and received better
treatment.65 Had he wished to take this route, the Chief Justice
could have acknowledged lower courts’ evolving post-Olech theory
58. See id. at 594-95.
59. See id. at 596.
60. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007).
61. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 609.
62. Id. at 602.
63. Id. at 603.
64. Id.
65. For a general discussion of the issues posed by the use of comparators in employment
discrimination law, see Goldberg, supra note 51, at 731. Professor Goldberg’s article considers
the use of comparators in the context of alleged discrimination on the basis of a statutorily
forbidden ground, such as race. Id. at 743; see also infra note 117 (discussing how claims of
trait-based discrimination are similar to, and different from, class-of-one claims for purposes
of comparator analysis).
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about the need for especially strict application of the similar-
situatedness requirement in class-of-one cases.66 The same
result—the plaintiff likely loses—would also have followed from
application of rational basis scrutiny, not just because such scrutiny
is so deferential, but also because the “subjective, individualized”
nature of the challenged decision would easily—indeed, natu-
rally—lend itself to a judge hypothesizing a rational basis for the
disparate treatment. In sum, these kinds of government actions are
tailor-made for court decisions finding either no similarly situated
comparator or a rational basis for the differential treatment.
Instead, the Court charted a different course. Chief Justice
Roberts argued that such individualized decisions were, as a formal,
per se matter, not amenable to a rule requiring equal treatment:
In such cases [involving subjective, individualized assessments]
the rule that people should be treated alike, under like circum-
stances and conditions is not violated when one person is treated
differently from others, because treating like individuals
differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted.
In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very
discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.67
He then provided an analogy of a police officer stationed on a busy
highway where many motorists speed and where it is thus impracti-
cal to expect the officer to ticket every speeder.68 He explained that
the unlucky recipient of a traffic ticket, if chosen at random, rather
than, say, on the basis of his race, would not have an equal protec-
tion claim, even though in some sense he had been singled out as a
class-of-one.69 According to Chief Justice Roberts, 
[A]llowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket
was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible
or articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion
66. Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining the rationale for
using a higher than normal similar-situatedness requirement for class-of-one cases); see
Araiza, supra note 49, at 51-52 (citing cases imposing this higher-than-normal requirement).
67. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603 (internal quotations omitted).
68. Id. at 603-04.
69. Id. at 604.
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inherent in the challenged action. It is no proper challenge to
what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it
was subjective and individualized.70
The Chief Justice’s argument elicits two responses. First, it bears
noting that, despite his attempt to lump together the traffic officer
and employment cases as both entailing subjective and individual-
ized decision making,71 the comparison is far from precise. The
traffic officer analogy postulates a situation in which the govern-
ment official has, literally, no reason to choose between ticketing
one driver instead of another. By contrast, many workplace cases
involve a situation in which the official had a panoply of rea-
sons—the set of employment-relevant factors such as collegiality
and work quality, among others—for distinguishing between
individual employees.72 Thus, even if the hypothesized employment
decision can be described as subjective and individualized, it is
analytically distinct, for equal protection purposes, from the police
officer analogy.
Second, even on its own terms the Chief Justice’s analysis is open
to question. Rather than viewing a situation such as the traffic
example as one in which the official’s need to make a random choice
itself constituted a rational basis for the randomness, the Court
instead simply placed such examples outside of equal protection’s
domain. This distinction between finding the officer’s random
decision rational, and thus consistent with equal protection, and
refusing to engage in equal protection review of the decision may
70. Id.
71. See id. at 603-04 (describing employment decisions in this way and describing the
traffic officer example using these same adjectives).
72. In his dissent, Justice Stevens addressed the issue somewhat differently. He
postulated the employment example as creating a situation in which the supervisor has to
choose among several equally-culpable employees for the purpose of laying one of them off.
Id. at 613-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id. at 611-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
how the case before the Court differed from such a case). Such a case is perhaps closer to the
police officer analogy, see id. at 613 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (conceding the analogy), but is
arguably a less realistic illustration of employment decisions, especially when the workplace
consists of employees performing more unique roles than the classic assembly-line
employment that characterized industrial America. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 5-6 (2004)
(noting the transformation of the American workplace in this direction). But even employees
in nonunique jobs nevertheless perform in ways that distinguish them from their coworkers
in relevant ways—for example, by working accurately, promptly, and in a collegial fashion.
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seem quite fine. But, as explained below, the formal exclusion of
such decisions from equal protection’s domain carries both practical
consequences and surprisingly serious implications for our theoreti-
cal understanding of equal protection and American constitutional-
ism more generally.73
Regardless of those implications, the fact remains that in
Engquist, the Court, analogizing employment class-of-one claims to
the traffic officer example, excised such claims from equal protection
review.74 Thus, even though Ms. Engquist had alleged that the
employer was motivated by animus and ill will, and a jury had
found for her on that count, the Court dismissed her suit.75
D. Engquist’s Impact
Engquist immediately affected lower courts’ resolutions of class-
of-one claims. Most straightforwardly, courts began dismissing
employment-related class-of-one claims.76 More generally, they
began considering whether Engquist’s analysis applied to situations
beyond employment that featured the same type of discretionary
decision making Engquist had identified as the key factor in its
analysis.77 Post-Engquist decisions relied on that analysis to dismiss
claims based on selective parole decisions,78 government
contracting,79 and municipal code80 and criminal law enforcement81
73. See infra Part III.
74. 553 U.S. at 604.
75. Id. at 596-97.
76. Blank v. Benzie Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 1:10-cv-201, 2012 WL 1085471, at *4-5
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2012); Lear v. Zanick, 850 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487-88 (M.D. Pa. 2012);
McDonald v. City of Saint Paul, 819 F. Supp. 2d 881, 888 n.6 (D. Minn. 2011); see Araiza,
supra note 49, at 67 n.239 (collecting early post-Engquist employment cases).
77. See Araiza, supra note 49, at 67 n.239 (collecting early post-Engquist cases analogizing
nonemployment contexts to Engquist’s analysis of government employment).
78. E.g., Adams v. Meloy, 287 F. App’x 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
79. E.g., Heusser v. Hale, 777 F. Supp. 2d 366, 382-85 (D. Conn. 2011) (applying Engquist
to defeat a claim by a towing service plaintiff against the government, on the ground that the
towing company was best considered a government employee); cf. Bekele v. Ford, No. C 11-
01640 WHA, 2011 WL 4368566, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2011) (allowing a class-of-one
claim to proceed at the behest of a parking lot operator, on the ground that the defendant-
government entity was acting as a proprietor, not a licensor or regulator, when it allegedly
discriminated against the plaintiff).
80. E.g., Papas v. Randall, No. 3:10-CV-00550-BR, 2012 WL 1445853, at *12-15 (D. Or.
Apr. 25, 2012); Occhionero v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 05-1184 LJO SMS, 2008 WL 2690431,
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and prosecution.82 At the same time, other courts have declined to
read Engquist as broadly.83 In at least some cases, the courts have
reached diametrically opposite results.84
The confusion implicit in these cases was recognized by, and
reflected in, the Seventh Circuit in 2012. In Del Marcelle v. Brown
County Corp., that court granted en banc review to a case in which
the plaintiff alleged a class-of-one violation in a police department’s
failure to investigate the activities of a motorcycle gang the plaintiff
alleged was harassing him.85 Judge Posner explained that the court
granted en banc review in order to clarify the standard to be applied
to class-of-one cases.86 Del Marcelle is notable in part because it
considered the appropriate standard for a class-of-one claim in the
context of a selective law enforcement claim, a subject one might
have thought was at least arguably foreclosed from judicial review
by Engquist’s analysis of the traffic officer hypothetical. 
Adding confusion to that uncertainty, the court failed in its self-
appointed task of clarifying the class-of-one doctrine, splitting three
ways on the proper mode of analysis and its application to selective
at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2008).
81. E.g., Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2009); Earnest
v. King, No. 2:11-cv-738, 2011 WL 5075380, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2011); Larson v.
Roussell, No. 09-3600 (PAM/AJB), 2011 WL 1533151, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2011).
82. E.g., Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1073-74 (D. Ariz. 2012) (investigative
and prosecutorial decisions); Gusler v. City of Long Beach, 823 F. Supp. 2d 98, 135 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (citing and following cases disallowing class-of-one cases in the context of selective
enforcement claims brought by government employees); Dowdell v. United States, No. 3:307-
cr-0010, 2011 WL 2270466, at *8 (W.D. Va. May 3, 2011) (prosecutorial decisions).
83. E.g., Aliberti v. Town of Brookhaven, 876 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(declining to apply Engquist to zoning decisions); Cutie v. Sheehan, No. 1:11-cv-66
(MAD/RFT), 2011 WL 4736358, at *7-9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (declining to apply Engquist
to decisions to decertify a Medicaid provider); Vlahadamis v. Kiernan, 837 F. Supp. 2d 131,
144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing the possibility of a class-of-one claim against the
government in its capacity as licensor, as long as the licensing decision could be thought of
as being based on a standard); Chestang v. Alcorn State Univ., 820 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (S.D.
Miss. 2011) (stating that Engquist applies only in the employment context).
84. Compare, e.g., DC3, LLC v. Town of Geneva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 418 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying Engquist to bar a class-of-one claim challenging a zoning decision), and cases cited
supra note 82 (applying Engquist to bar class-of-one claims challenging law enforcement
decisions), with Aliberti, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (declining to apply Engquist to a challenge
to a zoning decision), and Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp, 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012)
(declining to apply Engquist as a per se bar to a class-of-one theory challenging a law
enforcement decision). 
85. 680 F.3d at 888-89.
86. Id. at 889.
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law enforcement claims. Judge Posner, writing for four judges,
continued to insist that class-of-one plaintiffs point to some type of
animus or, in a concession to the Supreme Court, at least improper
personal motivation on the part of the government official-defen-
dant.87 Judge Wood, writing for five judges, tried harder to conform
her standard to Olech’s rejection of an animus requirement. She
proposed a test that imposed on the plaintiff a duty to show “inten-
tional” and “irrational” discrimination.88 Animus played a role in her
analysis, but of an evidentiary sort. As she explained, “[p]leading
animus or improper purpose will often be an effective way to
accomplish [the] goal” of proving “intentional” and “irrational”
discrimination.89 Judge Easterbrook, writing for himself alone,
concluded that the plaintiff lost both because resource constraints
provided a rational basis for the police’s decision not to investigate90
and because the Constitution did not provide any right to police
protection.91
As Del Marcelle illustrates, the Supreme Court’s class-of-one
jurisprudence has severely unsettled the lower courts. On the one
hand, Olech’s breezy dismissal of animus as a necessary element in
class-of-one cases triggered lower court pushback, as other judges
echoed Judge Posner’s and Justice Breyer’s concern about opening
federal courts to constitutional claims whenever the government
treats one citizen differently from another.92 On the other hand,
Engquist’s “meat axe” approach to cabining the class-of-one
doctrine93 has caused considerable uncertainty, as lower courts
struggle not just with whether other contexts are analogous to
employment, but also with whether fact patterns within those
contexts call for varied results, depending on a more precise
understanding of the challenged government action.94 This
87. See id. at 899 (announcing this standard); see also id. at 891-92 (noting his opinion in
Olech requiring animus and defending his post-Olech decision in Hilton v. City of Wheeling,
209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000), which required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
acted for “reasons of a personal nature”).
88. Id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 917 (Wood, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 900 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 901 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
92. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
93. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 610 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority’s approach in this way).
94. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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pushback and uncertainty is evident in Del Marcelle, in which nine
of the ten circuit judges entertained the possibility of a class-of-one
suit in the context of law enforcement—the very subject of
Engquist’s traffic officer analogy.95 Indeed, to complete the circle
back to class-of-one first principles, the two opinions gaining the
adherence of those judges debated the proper role of animus—the
very concept Olech insisted was irrelevant.96
This pushback and confusion strongly suggest that something is
wrong with the Court’s approach. Parts II and III consider, respec-
tively, the nature of the problem and its seriousness—in particular,
whether any flaws remain confined to the class-of-one doctrine or
whether they infect other areas of equal protection law. Part II
makes clear that there is a problem. Part III explains that the
Court’s jurisprudence may indeed be problematic beyond the
“murky corner of equal protection law”97 inhabited by the class-of-
one.
II. FLUNKING THE CLASS-OF-ONE: INTENT AND ANIMUS IN THE
CLASS-OF-ONE
The class-of-one doctrine squarely implicates foundational
components of equal protection doctrine. In particular, it raises
questions about the nature of the motivation required to satisfy the
doctrine’s intent requirement and the relationship of that intent to
animus, and thus to ultimate questions about when government
action violates equal protection.
A. Intent and the Class-of-One
Intent plays a well-known, if controversial, role in standard equal
protection analysis. Standard doctrine requires a plaintiff to prove
that the challenged action was motivated by an intent to classify on
a particular ground—for example, race or sex—after which the court
95. See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 899; id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 891-94; id. at 913-15 (Wood, J., dissenting).
97. LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing the class-of-one
doctrine as “a murky corner of equal protection law in which there are surprisingly few cases
and no clearly delineated rules to apply”).
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applies the appropriate level of scrutiny to the classification.98
Intent is understood as crucial to this inquiry; equal protection
violations arise only when the government has classified “‘because
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’”99 a certain trait, whose inherent
invidiousness or lack thereof determines the proper level of scrutiny.
Class-of-one cases present unique difficulties when applying the
intent requirement. For that reason they also shed light on the
proper role of intent in equal protection analysis more generally. In
most class-of-one cases there is no serious question but that, in the
common understanding of the term, the government official
intended to treat the plaintiff differently from others. The village
officials in Olech surely intended to impose a more severe burden on
the Olechs when they demanded a larger easement from them than
from other homeowners, and the supervisor in Engquist intended to
treat Ms. Engquist differently from her co-workers when he fired
her. Similarly, the police officer in Chief Justice Roberts’s hypotheti-
cal in Engquist presumably intends to issue a ticket to the speeder
he selects, while intending to let other speeders continue on. 
But courts considering class-of-one claims often require more of
plaintiffs than a simple showing that the government official did
what he intended to do.100 As noted earlier, pre- and even post-Olech
courts often required that the defendant not only have intentionally
singled-out the plaintiff for poor treatment but have done so with a
bad subjective motivation.101 More recently, courts have continued
to experiment with such second-order intent requirements, even in
98. See Pollvogt, supra note 2, at 895-97 (describing the Court’s modern “tiers-of-scrutiny”
framework).
99. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
100. In one sense this insistence on “more” intent reflects black-letter equal protection law
that deems government’s awareness of its discriminatory action insufficient to constitute
discriminatory intent. See id. at 279 (holding that such awareness is insufficient to establish
the requisite discriminatory intent). In the class-of-one context, however, “mere” awareness
of the type at issue in Feeney melds into more direct intent. For example, the supervisor in
Engquist was surely both aware that he was firing Ms. Engquist and, in a fundamental way,
“intended” to fire her. This is distinct from a situation such as that in Feeney, in which the
government may concede that it was aware that its purposeful action would disparately
impact one group, but still deny that it intended to classify on that basis. The distinction
between these two situations reflects the more complex relationship between the intent
requirement and the class-of-one, and thus warrants a closer examination of how the intent
requirement should apply to class-of-one claims.
101. See supra notes 31-40, 49-51 and accompanying text.
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cases in which Engquist suggests a per se rule precluding an equal
protection claim. For example, in Del Marcelle Judge Wood sug-
gested an approach that would allow a law enforcement class-of-one
claim to go forward as long as the plaintiff showed that the govern-
ment official acted in a way that reflected more than a simple use
of his discretion to make a subjective decision.102 She suggested that
the plaintiff could satisfy this burden in several ways, including by
alleging that the defendant singled the plaintiff out because of
animus.103 In such a case, animus would not function as a constitu-
tional requirement, in light of the Court’s explicit rejection of such
a requirement in Olech; rather, an allegation of animus would play
an evidentiary role, buttressing the plaintiff’s ultimate claim of
intentional discrimination.104 She also suggested that a set of facts
could be so egregious that, in a manner akin to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, they would suffice to demonstrate intentional
discrimination, triggering equal protection scrutiny.105
The class-of-one theory requires such nuanced application of the
intent requirement’s demand that government have targeted a
plaintiff “‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of,’”106 the forbidden trait,
because in class-of-one cases no forbidden trait exists; the plaintiff
is singled out as an individual, not as a member of a racial or other
group. This feature of class-of-one claims requires a translation of 
the standard intent formula into the unique context of the class-of-
one. Properly harmonizing the “‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’”
formula with this unique characteristic of class-of-one claims should
therefore require that the official have singled out the plaintiff
because of who the plaintiff is—that is, because of her identity. This
understanding of intent honors the Court’s intuition in Engquist
that the traffic officer cannot be the legitimate object of a class-of-
102. See, e.g., Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 915 (2012) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 914.
104. See id.
105. See id. (citing Geinosky v. Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) as an example of such
facts). In Geinosky the plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of class-of-one discrimination
based on a long series of parking tickets he received, some of which were inconsistent with
each other—for example, with one ticket claiming that the car was parked in one spot at a
particular moment when another ticket claimed the same car was parked in a different spot
at exactly the same moment. 675 F.3d at 745.
106. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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one claim because his job necessarily requires him to ticket some
speeders while letting others go unticketed.107 But it does so by
concluding that the officer did not have the requisite intent, even if,
as a technical matter, he intended to ticket the plaintiff while
intending to leave another speeder untouched. This first order,
common parlance type of “intent” does not satisfy the intent
requirement because the officer did not decide to ticket the plaintiff
“because of” the driver’s identity.108 Only if the official based his
decision on the plaintiff’s identity—for example, because he
recognized a romantic rival’s car and on that basis selected him for
the ticket—should we say that a class-of-one defendant acted with
the requisite discriminatory intent.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Roberts did not take this analytical
route in Engquist. Instead, he reasoned that the subjective and
discretionary nature of the officer’s decision, like employment
decision actually at issue in Engquist, justified a wholesale, per se
rule excluding such class-of-one claims from the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantee.109 And indeed, even though he cautioned that
the Court in Engquist was simply deciding the fate of class-of-one
government employment claims,110 lower courts have subsequently
relied on his analysis to justify extending Engquist’s per se rule to
a variety of other contexts featuring similarly subjective and
discretionary decision making.111 Those cases include situations in
which the decision maker satisfied the intent requirement, as Judge
Wood’s analysis explains it. For example, the Court’s approach
would bar a class-of-one claim brought by a government employee
(or speeder) who could prove that her supervisor (or the ticketing
officer) singled her out because he knew the plaintiff and laid her off
(or ticketed her) out of vindictiveness. It is hard to see how such
claims would not be governed by Engquist; after all, the claim
107. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603-04 (2008).
108. Indeed, in such a case the officer lacks even the awareness of the driver’s identity that
Feeney held fails to satisfy the intent requirement, in the context of standard group-based
equal protection. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”).
109. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603-04.
110. See id. at 607 (limiting the Court’s holding to employment claims).
111. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (noting lower court cases applying
Engquist beyond the employment context).
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rejected in Engquist itself featured an allegation that the employer
had acted out of animus.112
This result is unfortunate, both in terms of class-of-one doctrine
in particular and equal protection more generally.113 The problem is
not primarily with the results, although results will be different in
a very small number of cases.114 Class-of-one claims challenging
subjective and discretionary decisions should in fact usually fail.
But those results should not flow from a per se rule excluding such
decisions from equal protection scrutiny. Rather, they should
usually fail for other reasons. In the employment context, for
example, such claims should usually fail because the decision’s
subjective or discretionary nature normally means that the
decisional criteria are so particularized that a plaintiff cannot prove
the existence of a similarly-situated comparator. Scholars of
employment discrimination law have forcefully criticized the
comparator requirement.115 Whatever its limitations as a tool in
deciding standard discrimination cases, however, the unique context
of class-of-one cases renders the comparator question use-
ful—though not necessarily dispositive116—in culling meritless
claims.117 Thus, courts applying this approach would continue to
112. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 594.
113. For the argument that Engquist’s analysis is unfortunate for equal protection doctrine
more generally, see infra Part III.
114. One likely example of this small set of cases is Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d
511, 524 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the court found a class-of-one violation in the employment
context when the employer was held to have disciplined the plaintiff-employee simply out of
a desire to find a scapegoat for the poor provision of government services. Presumably, as an
employment case Ciechon would have come out in the government’s favor had it been decided
after Engquist. Under this Article’s proposed analysis, however, the illegitimate motivation
driving the government decision would have yielded a result in favor of the plaintiff. Of
course, Engquist itself would also have come out differently, given the plaintiff’s animus-based
argument, which a jury accepted. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 596.
115. See generally Goldberg, supra note 51 (critiquing what she views as courts’ over-
reliance on comparator analysis in statutory employment discrimination law).
116. See, e.g., Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 914 (2012) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (discussing a case in which the facts are so egregious that one can infer a likely
class-of-one violation despite the lack of a realistic comparator).
117. Most notably, class-of-one cases are distinct from other discrimination cases, such as
those based on employment discrimination statutes, in that they do not rest on a particular
identity trait—for example, sex—as a forbidden ground of discrimination. Rather, the central
feature of a class-of-one claim is the plaintiff’s allegation that he was treated differently, not
on the basis of a broad-based characteristic such as sex, but rather from some other
individual. Thus, while comparator analysis might not always accurately uncover the
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reject the vast majority of class-of-one claims challenging decisions
that require the decision maker to make decisions based on a collage
of particularized pieces of data, such as an employment decision
based on factors such as performance, collegiality and absenteeism. 
This sounder analytical approach would also reject equal
protection challenges to decisions, such as the officer’s decision to
ticket one driver rather than another, that cannot be explained
because, rather than being based on too many factors, they are
based on no factors at all. In the traffic officer case it is quite
reasonable to say that the officer has not intentionally treated the
existence of illegal characteristic-based discrimination, such analysis may be more
appropriate when evaluating the class-of-one plaintiff’s allegation of worse treatment than
another particular individual.
This distinction can be overstated. As Professor Goldberg notes, the rise of “second-
generation” discrimination, in particular, discrimination claims revolving around the
plaintiff’s intersectional identity—that is, her composite identity, say, as an Asian woman
rather than “merely” an Asian or a woman—are not easily susceptible to comparator analysis.
See Goldberg, supra note 51, at 764-66. To the extent that such intersectional plaintiffs run
into trouble because their alleged ground of discrimination is so precise that no workplace
comparator exists, such claims approach, at least conceptually, the problem faced by a class-
of-one plaintiff whose unique set of relevant characteristics dooms her claim for lack of a
comparator. Still, the fact that the sex discrimination plaintiff alleges discrimination based
on a particular forbidden ground renders her claim more judicially-manageable than an
analogous claim by a class-of-one plaintiff. Thus, it may be less justifiable for courts
considering ordinary discrimination claims to stake their analysis entirely on a search for
comparators. See, e.g., id. at 780-85 (suggesting ways in which courts can cut through the
problems posed by comparator analysis in employment claims to perceive more directly
whether the defendant engaged in the forbidden discrimination). 
But even here one can perceive a distant analogy to the class-of-one context. In particular,
this Article’s focus on animus as a crucial component of class-of-one claims distantly echoes
Professor Goldberg’s argument that, at base, what employment discrimination law prohibits
is, literally, discrimination that is based on the forbidden ground, with comparator analysis
appropriately playing at most only an evidentiary rather than a dispositive role in the inquiry.
See, e.g., id. at 785. So too with this Article’s class-of-one analysis: its focus on animus as the
key to class-of-one claims rests on the conclusion that what the class-of-one idea prohibits is
discrimination based on the identity of the plaintiff as an individual. As explained above, such
identity-based discrimination fundamentally means discrimination based on a desire to
burden the plaintiff based on that identity—in other words, animus. See supra text
accompanying notes 106-08. Indeed, one can envision a meritorious class-of-one claim that
lacks a realistic comparator. See, e.g., Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 914 (Wood, J., dissenting)
(discussing a case in which the facts are so egregious that one can infer a likely class-of-one
violation despite the lack of a realistic comparator); cf. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 611
(1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting in a statutory discrimination context that a
finding of animus might substitute for a discrimination plaintiff’s lack of a comparator in
establishing the defendant’s liability); Goldberg, supra note 51, at 732 (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s statement in Olmstead).
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plaintiff differently, as long as “intent” focuses on the plaintiff’s
status as a particular individual. Perhaps ironically then, an
officer’s shrug of the shoulders and simple “I don’t know” response
to the question asking why he ticketed A rather than B—if not
disproven—should doom the plaintiff’s claim.
The reason for these results is simple, but reflective of a funda-
mental equal protection principle: in neither the employment nor
the ticketing case can the plaintiff successfully prove intentional
differential treatment of similarly-situated persons. This approach
thus continues to ensure that government escapes liability as long
as its decision making process honors equality principles to the
extent that process allows.118 In other words, it adapts the intent
requirement to the special case of the class-of-one and, indeed, the
subset of class-of-one claims involving what the Engquist Court
described as “subjective and individualized” decisions.119 As courts
both before and after Engquist recognized, applying this type of
approach at the pleading phase of litigation protects government not
just from inappropriate liability but also from frivolous litigation
that both absorbs government time and raises the specter of
nuisance settlements.120 But, unlike the approach adopted in
Engquist, this proposed approach still allows claims to go forward
when discretionary decisions are alleged to have been contaminated
by dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated people that reflects the
118. For a more despairing—or potentially simply cavalier—treatment of government’s
equal treatment obligations in difficult contexts, see Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604 (“But assuming
that it is in the nature of the particular government activity that not all speeders can be
stopped and ticketed, complaining that one has been singled out for no reason does not invoke
the fear of improper government classification. Such a complaint, rather, challenges the
legitimacy of the underlying action itself—the decision to ticket speeders under such
circumstances.... [A]llowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was given
to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason, would be
incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action. It is no proper challenge
to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and
individualized.”). It is hard to read this language as anything less than a curt dismissal of the
possibility that vindictive or other inappropriately-motivated singling out of an individual by
a government officer might amount to differential treatment that violates the equal protection
guarantee.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 914 (noting the need for some class-of-one plaintiffs
to plead their facts more precisely); Araiza, supra note 49, at 50 nn.143 & 144 (citing pre-
Engquist cases imposing a similar requirement).
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level of intent discussed above.121 That level of intent corresponds to
the analogous requirement in standard equal protection cases.
Imposing that requirement, but allowing claims to go forward if the
plaintiff satisfies it, both harmonizes the class-of-one with the rest
of equal protection doctrine and, as explained in the next two sub-
sections, protects equal protection’s core values in a judicially
manageable way. 
B. Animus and the Class-of-One
Properly understood, the intent requirement fits comfortably with
the fundamental equal protection rule that government action must
promote a public purpose and not be based on personal motivations,
most notably—but not exclusively122—animus. Standard equal
protection doctrine requires that government always act pursuant
to a public purpose,123 a requirement that deems an official’s private
goals an illegitimate justification for official conduct.124 Courts may
121. Indeed, this approach, by asking these questions, would quite likely be easier for lower
courts to apply than Engquist’s blunt rule disallowing class-of-one challenges to all subjective
and discretionary decisions. For example, the issue in Del Marcelle, in which the police
department failed to investigate the plaintiff’s complaints about a gang’s harassment, bears
a superficial resemblance to Engquist’s traffic officer example. In both cases, the argument
goes, the police have too many wrongdoers—or complaints about wrongdoing—and have to
make discretionary judgments about which ones to pursue. By contrast, under this approach
the Del Marcelle example would be more analogous to the employment situation: just like a
supervisor’s decision whom to lay off, the sheriff’s decision in Del Marcelle regarding which
crimes to investigate would presumably be based on a large number of considerations, such
as the seriousness of the complaints, their likely veracity, and the attention particular
neighborhoods have or have not received from law enforcement. Utilizing this more precise
method of understanding a given class-of-one claim challenging subjective and discretionary
decisions would help courts better identify the pleading and factual hurdles appropriately
imposed on the given class-of-one plaintiff—at least as compared with the imprecision
inherent in Engquist’s overly simplistic focus simply on the decision’s subjective and
discretionary nature. 
122. See infra notes 145-48 (citing cases involving various types of illegitimate motives).
123. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490-91 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[A] court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must
strike down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class
of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.”).
124. See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 12 at 350. (“[T]he requirement that laws
be equal rests upon a theory of legislation quite distinct from that of pressure groups—a
theory which puts forward some conception of a ‘general good’ as the ‘legitimate public
purpose’ at which legislation must aim, and according to which the triumph of private or
group pressure marks the corruption of the legislative process.”); see also R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
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be incapable of completely enforcing this rule.125 Most notably,
under traditional, highly deferential, rational basis review courts
may hypothesize a legitimate public purpose which the challenged
classification might be assumed to pursue.126 This generous review
standard raises the real possibility that government action would be
upheld despite its reflection of either officials’ own personal
interests or their cooperation with private parties’ rent-seeking.127
Nevertheless, the public purpose/anti-animus requirement remains,
even if underenforced, as a foundational principle of equal protec-
tion128 and American constitutionalism more generally.129 
The search for animus often takes an indirect form when courts
apply more than standard rational basis review to an equal
protection claim. As is well-known, courts applying more stringent
judicial scrutiny subject the challenged action to a rigorous ends-
means test. Both justices and scholars have explained the most
stringent version of this test, strict scrutiny, as a way of uncovering
ultimate illegitimate intent. For example, in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., Justice O’Connor employed this rationale to defend
the Court’s use of strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of
a race classification decision against the argument that “benign”
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I ... believe that we must discover
a correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or a
legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature. If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature,
its impartiality would be suspect. If, however, the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed
as an acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could rationally decide
that that cost should be incurred.”).
125. But see infra Part III (noting the possibility that Engquist may come to be understood
as announcing a more relaxed constitutional requirement, which is completely enforced by
rational basis review).
126. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 463 (1988) (“In performing
this [rational basis] analysis, we are not bound by explanations of the statute’s rationality
that may be offered by litigants or other courts.”).
127. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 3, at 246 (describing the statute upheld in Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), as quite possibly reflecting such cooperation with private
rent-seeking); see also Einer R. Elhague, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 45-48 (1991) (discussing scholars who have called for
more stringent judicial review to curb rent-seeking legislation).
128. See supra notes 122-24.
129. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
public purpose requirement as fundamental); infra note 174 (discussing recognition of the
fundamental nature of the public purpose requirement). 
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uses of race did not merit such review.130 She argued that height-
ened scrutiny “smoked out” illegitimate uses of race by revealing
when the use of race was, in fact, not necessary to the achievement
of an appropriate government interest.131 Her analysis suggests that
the inevitable inference to be drawn if the action fails strict scrutiny
is that that action was motivated by an illegitimate intent.132
Such an indirect search is not limited to explicitly heightened
scrutiny. Consider Romer v. Evans, the 1996 case in which the
Supreme Court claimed to use rational basis review to strike down
Colorado’s constitutional amendment barring state government and
its local units from conferring protected status on the basis of sexual
orientation.133 The Court considered Colorado’s justifications for the
law—protection of persons’ associational rights and conservation of
enforcement resources for combating other types of discrimina-
tion—and found them insufficiently related to the law to credit as
possible justifications.134 With those legitimate justifications
discarded as possible explanations for the law, the Court concluded,
essentially by a process of elimination, that the only remaining
justification for the law was simple dislike of gays and lesbians.135
So understood, Romer reflects the same type of analysis as that
performed in Croson, with its only remarkable feature being the
Court’s willingness to reject the government’s justifications so
readily despite the Court’s ostensible use of rational basis review.
130. 488 U.S. 469, 721 (1989).
131. See id.; PERRY, supra note 11, at 102 (explaining strict scrutiny of governmental uses
of race “is the Court’s shrewd, practical way of ferreting out, indirectly or by proxy, what
might otherwise be the hidden racist rationale for a law”); Powell, supra note 3, at 236 (“In
Croson, Justice O’Connor’s rationale for employing strict scrutiny seems to rely on an
underlying view of equal protection that identifies the intentional or purposeful infliction of
harm as the primary concern of equal protection with respect to race.”); see also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 136-45 (1980) (explaining
heightened scrutiny on a theory based on the uncovering of government intent).
132. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification
for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”).
133. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
134. Id. at 635.
135. Id. at 635-36. This conclusion was buttressed by the alternative theory offered in
Romer, that the Colorado law constituted a literal violation of equal protection by placing
gays, lesbians and bisexuals outside the protection of state law. See id. at 632-34 (setting forth
this argument). 
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Sometimes the facts of a case allow the search for animus to take
a more direct form. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, the Court struck down a local government’s decision
to deny a zoning variance to allow the establishment of a group
home for the mentally retarded in a particular neighborhood.136 The
Court’s surprising conclusion that the challenged decision failed
rational basis review was likely aided by the trial court’s finding
that the zoning decision was motivated in part by the local resi-
dents’ fear of the mentally retarded persons who would live in the
home.137 The trial court’s finding about the role private biases
played in the government action revealed the sort of explicit animus
that was lacking in Croson and Romer. That suspicion of animus
likely played a role in the Court’s use of an unusually stringent
version of rationality review.138
In all these cases, animus or another non-public-regarding
motive139 was the conclusion to which the Court’s analysis inevitably
led. On their face, class-of-one cases seem amenable to the same
approach, involving judicial testing of the classification against
either the proffered or any hypothesized justification. If the
classification lacked a rational connection to any of those justifica-
tions, the court would strike it down, concluding, either explicitly or
as a necessary implication, that the government’s action was
motivated by an inappropriate purpose. 
But applying such conventional rationality review to class-of-one
claims raises both practical and conceptual difficulties. First, as a
matter of litigation practicalities, the deferral of the application of
rational basis review until after either a trial or even a period of
discovery raises the specter of frivolous and costly litigation that
would cost the government either time and resources or the money
necessary to fund settlements offered to avoid the nuisance cost of
litigating. Such costs always exist in litigation, but the limitless
scope for class-of-one litigation after Olech’s endorsement of a broad
136. 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
137. See Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 194, 202 (5th Cir. 1984)
(noting trial court findings on the City Council’s reasons for its denial of the permit).
138. Cf. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458-60 (Marshall, J., concurring) (pointing out the stringency
of the Court’s ostensible rational basis review).
139. See infra note 135.
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class-of-one theory140—a scope that remains potentially broad even
after Engquist, given Engquist’s uncertain reception in the lower
courts—makes the specter of such costs particularly problematic in
the class-of-one area.141 Second, the existence of cases such as
Engquist’s traffic officer hypothetical—in which, quite literally, the
government lacks any reason for its action—raises the specter of
government liability for failure to satisfy even the defendant-
friendly rational basis test.142 These concerns may well have
motivated the Engquist Court to excise what it described as
“subjective” and “discretionary” government decisions from potential
class-of-one liability.
These concerns are reasonable, especially in the context of at least
some subjective and discretionary decisions in which it might be
difficult for courts to articulate a rational justification for the
plaintiff’s unfavorable treatment.143 But the Court could have
chosen a more nuanced method of limiting class-of-one litigation
and potential liability. Rather than rejecting entire categories of
class-of-one claims outright, the Court could have required, either
generally or in cases involving subjective and discretionary govern-
ment decisions, that plaintiffs show direct evidence of animus. As
140. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (endorsing class-of-one claims
without requiring the plaintiff to plead or allege animus); see also id. (Breyer, J., concurring)
(expressing concern about the wide scope of liability endorsed by the Court’s approach).
141. It may also be particularly problematic because claims of animus against an individual
may be especially fact-intensive, and thus resistant to dismissal on the pleadings.
142. It may be important to consider at this point the possibility of government offering as
a reason for its differential treatment the brute need to burden someone, without regard to
the identity of that person. Most notably, Engquist’s traffic officer hypothetical may yield a
government explanation that the officer had to ticket someone, even if he had no reason for
ticketing one driver rather than another. As explained in the prior subsection, such a
justification, if not disproven, should in fact win the case for the government—but only
because it establishes that the officer did not have the requisite intent to harm the motorist
who was randomly chosen to receive the ticket. See supra Part II.A. Indeed, without such
intent it would be impossible for the plaintiff to prove unconstitutional animus. In sum, then,
the Court might be reasonable in having this concern—especially given its breezy dismissal
of an animus requirement in Olech. 528 U.S. at 565. However, this concern can be resolved
through a means much less draconian than Engquist’s per se rule excising such claims from
equal protection’s domain.
143. The qualifier “at least some” is appropriate here because, as explained earlier in the
context of employment claims, even many subjective and discretionary government decisions
may be amenable to a court’s articulation of a rational justification for the disparate
treatment. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 (explaining this dynamic in the context
of employment claims).
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lower courts have recognized, that limitation, especially if imposed
as part of pleading and not just ultimate proof requirements, helps
cull inappropriate uses of the class-of-one theory. Many—probably
most—examples of government action distinguishing between two
citizens are presumably made innocently—that is, as an application
of a decision-making process free of personal bias against the citizen
or other inappropriate personal motivations. Modern impersonal
bureaucracies process claims, consider applications, and render
decisions in massive quantities. Occasions in which such decisions
are infected by bias or other inappropriate personal motive, such as
corruption, are likely quite small. That likelihood makes the animus
requirement an effective litigation gatekeeper.
Animus is also a principled gatekeeper. A foundational principle
of American constitutionalism holds that government must act in
pursuit of a public purpose. Government may sometimes fail in that
pursuit; no institution is perfect.144 But it remains the case that
government must at least try or, more precisely, must not aim at the
opposite: a purely private-regarding outcome. Institutional incapac-
ity may make it impossible or inappropriate for courts to infer such
illegitimate motivation indirectly, beyond the special circumstances
of explicitly or implicitly heightened review as in Croson and Romer,
respectively. In particular, courts would be stretching their
competence and authority to the breaking point if they examined
the millions of discretionary decisions government makes every year
to determine if their lack of rationality implied illegitimate personal
motives.145 But even if that larger task exceeds the judicial grasp,
courts presumably remain capable of adjudicating the smaller
universe of allegations of explicit animus: vindictiveness,146
144. Of course, some—presumably a very small—percentage of government actions may
be “innocent”—that is, untainted by animus—but nevertheless utterly irrational. Such cases
of “innocent irrationality” may well be better understood as implicating the Due Process
Clause in light of their lack of animus toward the targeted individual that would otherwise
characterize such claims as sounding in equal protection. See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (acknowledging that due process limits the ability of
government to act arbitrarily and explaining that the particular standard to apply when
determining arbitrariness varies with the factual context of the challenged government
action); see also Araiza, supra note 14, at 509-15 (discussing “pure irrationality” claims).
145. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (expressing concern about the prospect of
stringent judicial scrutiny of every government action that caused a racially disparate
impact).
146. See, e.g., Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 2000) (class-of-
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corruption,147 or other phenomena that infect government action
with an illegitimate, private motivation.148 This is especially true
when courts require plaintiffs not just to prove such a motive, but
to plead it.
In allowing class-of-one claims to go forward if animus is
appropriately pled and to be vindicated if animus is proven, courts
honor, in a workable manner, the fundamental precept of American
constitutionalism that government must always seek to promote the
public interest. In removing from equal protection’s domain claims
such as Ms. Engquist’s, which included allegations that the
government action was infected by animus, the Court did more than
cut class-of-one claims off in too wholesale a manner. More impor-
tantly, it excised class-of-one claims that reflect a core commitment
of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Constitution more gener-
ally. As explained in Part III, Engquist’s approach constitutes a
serious flaw in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, one whose
implications extend far beyond the limited confines of the class-of-
one. 
C. Intent and Animus Reconsidered
Before turning to Engquist’s broader impact on American
constitutionalism, a concluding word should be said about the class-
of-one’s lessons for both the relationship between intent and
animus, and the logic of the intent requirement. The intent
requirement has been heavily criticized as unduly constricting equal
protection’s scope.149 Despite those critiques, it has remained a
feature of equal protection law for a generation150 with no indication
one claim involving allegation of vindictiveness).
147. See, e.g., Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2000) (class-of-one
claim involving allegation of corruption).
148. See, e.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982) (class-of-one
claim involving allegation of government scapegoating to deflect unfavorable publicity).
149. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 49-51 (1977); Lawrence, supra note 1,
at 319-20.
150. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1976) (requiring equal protection
plaintiffs to prove intent). Davis has come to be understood as the foundational case stating
this requirement. See Karst, supra note 149, at 49 (describing Davis as “the leading citation
for the ‘purpose’ doctrine”).
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that it is going away.151 This Article’s discussion of intent’s role in
the class-of-one raises the question whether its insights offer more
general lessons about that requirement. 
This Article has argued that the intent requirement plays two
useful and interrelated roles in class-of-one analysis. First, it
provides a principled basis for rejecting class-of-one claims challeng-
ing the sort of random government action at issue in Engquist’s
police officer hypothetical.152 Of course in Engquist, Chief Justice
Roberts provided his own reasoning for rejecting such claims. But
recall that his reasoning was quite broad and would justify rejecting
class-of-one challenges to all subjective and discretionary decisions,
even when the government conduct is conceded to be vindictive,
corrupt, or otherwise privately-motivated.153 Our intuitive reluc-
tance to embrace a per se rule excluding this latter type of claim
from equal protection’s domain reveals the second useful role the
intent requirement plays. By focusing judicial concern on actions in
which the government official intended to burden the plaintiff
because of the plaintiff’s identity,154 that requirement captures the
situations in which such illegitimate motivations are likely to exist.
Thus, in the class-of-one context, the intent requirement helps cull
lawsuits, while allowing claims to proceed when they allege a
violation of equal protection’s core prohibition on private-regarding
government action. It does so by exploiting the close logical
connection between the concepts of discriminatory intent and
unconstitutional animus.
Does the intent requirement play a similarly helpful and
principled filtering role in other equal protection contexts? The
above analysis suggests that the answer turns on the characteristics
of the particular context at issue. It explains that, in class-of-one
cases, the intent requirement helps sharpen courts’ focus on core
constitutional violations—specifically, violations of the prohibition
on private-regarding action. In other contexts, most notably race,
the intent requirement may not play such a role. For example, one
151. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the
Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 940-41
(2008)  (noting the modern Court’s continued adherence to the intent requirement).
152. See supra Part I.C.
153. See supra Part I.D.
154. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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can easily understand that, in the context of race, equal protection’s
core meaning focuses on uprooting the system of racial hierarchy
reflected not just in slavery but in the Black Codes that were the
specific target of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.155 As scholars have
noted, the pervasiveness of racism and racial hierarchy in American
society and the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to uproot it
may justify a different decision about the constitutional need for an
intent requirement in that context.156
At one level, then, the class-of-one doctrine says little about the
appropriateness of the intent requirement as a general feature of
equal protection law. But that very lack of general meaning reveals
an important insight. By insisting that evaluation of the intent
requirement focus on the particular type of discrimination at issue,
and how that requirement addresses that type of discrimination, the
class-of-one doctrine illustrates the intent requirement’s contextual
nature. The class-of-one example thus liberates equal protection law
from the formalistic comprehensiveness of the intent requirement,
revealing instead that requirement’s more contextualized relation-
ship to the constitutional guarantee. Sometimes, as in the class-of-
one doctrine itself, an intent requirement is indispensable. At other
times, as with race, perhaps it is not.157 
This analysis yields a final insight about the intent requirement.
The more contingent understanding of the intent requirement
revealed above in turn suggests that the intent requirement const-
itutes something less than core constitutional law and more of
155. Scholars with very different views on the Fourteenth Amendment all agree that at
least one of its primary motivations was to provide a secure constitutional foundation for that
statute. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 26-27 (2d ed. 1997); WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
104 (1988); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 224-25 (1965).
156. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 149, at 51 (“If we were talking about some new form of
discrimination—say, discrimination against persons with red hair, or discrimination against
whites—then the ‘purpose’ doctrine would make eminent sense.... But in America today,
where the problem of racism is the problem of eliminating a long-established stigma of
inferiority ... it is as plain as a cattle prod that we are talking about something quite different.
A legislature oblivious to this existing stigma of caste will nonetheless reinforce the stigma
when it produces racially discriminatory effects through ostensibly ‘neutral’ legislation.”).
157. This Article does not purport to be a comprehensive discussion of how the intent
requirement should apply in race cases. For a sample of the voluminous literature on that
question, see Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 1; Lawrence,
supra note 151; Karst, supra note 149, at 41.
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a decision rule open to congressional alteration. Such an under-
standing fits nicely with existing doctrine, which recognizes
Congress’s power to dispense with a plaintiff’s obligation to prove
discriminatory intent when alleging equal protection violations.158
Such legislative waivers may be appropriate, for example, as a
practical matter when evidentiary difficulties in proving intent
threaten to defeat meritorious claims of invidious discrimination or,
more fundamentally, when structural or unconscious racism or
sexism yields violations of the equality norm without actually
exhibiting the type of intent identified by the doctrine.159 These
concerns are easily accommodated when the intent requirement is
understood less as an inflexible, across-the-board, core constitu-
tional command and more as a constitutional decision rule appropri-
ate in some circumstances but not in others. The analysis of intent’s
role in class-of-one cases suggests the correctness of such an
understanding.
III. FAILING EQUAL PROTECTION: THE CLASS-OF-ONE, THE     
RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Court’s class-of-one jurisprudence threatens to create a
serious tear in the fabric of rational basis review and, with it,
American constitutionalism more generally. Rational basis review
is often a stepchild of constitutional law jurisprudence and scholar-
ship. Except when it appears to hide more muscular scrutiny, as
with the well-known equal protection trio of Moreno v. Department
of Agriculture,160 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,161 and
Romer v. Evans,162 and (possibly) the Court’s due process decision in
158. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (noting the practical
difficulties courts would face if they accorded higher scrutiny to all decisions that had racially
disparate impacts, and stating that expansion of government liability for discrimination was
a job better left for Congress); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980)
(holding, on the same day that it decided that discriminatory intent was required to show a
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, that Congress’s power to enforce that amendment
included the power to wipe away that limitation).
159. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 1, at 319-20 (arguing that the intent requirement does
not account for a great deal of discrimination that should be understood as violating equal
protection).
160. 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973).
161. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
162. 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
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Lawrence v. Texas,163 rationality review usually elicits little
jurisprudential or scholarly attention. This lack of attention is
understandable; with the exception of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer
trilogy, Lawrence, and the scattering of other heightened rational
basis cases,164 rationality review reliably yields a government
victory with little judicial analysis.165 But, however understandable,
this inattention is still unfortunate. Even if it rarely triggers careful
judicial analysis, the requirement that government action be
rational remains, along with the anti-animus requirement to which
163. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). It should be noted that the description of Lawrence as a
rational basis case is not unanimously accepted. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth
Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 782
(2013) (noting that Lawrence declined to identify the scrutiny level it was applying, and
suggesting the possibility that the Lawrence Court “rejected the tiers-of-scrutiny framework
entirely”).
164. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989)
(striking down, as failing equal protection rational basis review, application of a property tax
valuation method that conflicted with the state constitution’s mandate of “equal and uniform”
property taxes); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 624 (1985) (striking down,
as failing equal protection rational basis review, a state tax exemption for veterans that
applied only to veterans who were state residents when they performed their military service);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 223-24 (1982) (striking down, as failing equal protection
rational basis review, a state law denying public education opportunities to children of
persons illegally in the United States); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking
down, as failing equal protection rational basis review, a state law allocating shares of a state
trust fund based on the length of residence in the state).
165. But see Araiza, supra note 3, at 898-99 (examining Justice Stevens’s more careful
approach to rationality review).
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it is often related,166 a foundational principle of American
constitutionalism.167
The Court’s class-of-one jurisprudence raises questions about that
foundational principle as applied to equal protection and beyond.168
Most notably, in Engquist the Court implied that some examples of
166. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 3, at 228 (emphasis omitted) (“Rational-basis scrutiny, as
traditionally understood, flows from a presupposition of American constitutionalism so basic
and pervasive that it is easy to overlook: in its dealings with persons, the American
government is under a constitutional obligation to act rationally. Rationality in turn requires
both that public actions make sense and that they make good sense, that they have some
legitimate purpose.”); id. at 274 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(brackets omitted) (“Although the Constitution’s text does not demand, in so many words, that
government act rationally, the dominant assumption has long been that irrational official
decisions are inconsistent with the constitutional norms of due process and equal protection.
Furthermore ... the rationality necessary to affirm the validity of a law or other public action
turns on the presence in official decisions of independent considerations in the public interest,
independent of sheer caprice or the desire to use public authority to pursue private or
malicious ends.”); see also Pollvogt, supra note 2 (discussing the anti-animus requirement in
the context of rationality review cases).
The Court reaffirmed the centrality of the anti-animus requirement in its 2013 decision in
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), striking down Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). In Windsor the Court largely (though not completely) eschewed the
traditional equal protection inquiry into the precision with which the challenged law served
a legitimate government purpose. Instead, it directly examined DOMA’s text and legislative
history, and based on that examination concluded that its “principal purpose and necessary
effect” was “to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marrige.” Id. at 2695.
Windsor’s method of inquiry elevates the animus determination to a central role. Indeed,
even the Court’s earlier opinion in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), also written by
Justice Kennedy and with which Windsor will likely be compared, reached its animus
conclusion through a more indirect path. In Romer, the Court noted the unusual breadth of
Amendment 2 and, partially on that basis, rejected as irrational any connection between it
and any legitimate state interest. Windsor distantly echoed this approach when it expressed
concern about DOMA’s breadth and its assertedly unusual characteristic of rejecting a state’s
definition of marriage—indeed, describing the latter characteristic as “strong evidence” that
the law’s “purpose and effect” was “disapproval of [the] class” of same-sex couples. 133 S. Ct.
at 2693. But while Romer at least tested the fit between the challenged law and the
government’s justification for the challenged law, the Windsor majority did not. See, e.g., id.
at 2707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out this omission). Instead, as suggested above,
it appears to have grounded this animus conclusion in a more direct examination of the
statute itself. See also William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to
Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constructionalism, 94 B.U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2310586
(discussing how Windsor largely abandoned traditional equal protection “fit” analysis in favor
of a more direct inquiry into whether the challenged legislation was motivated by animus).
167. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
168. See Powell, supra note 3, at 253 (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s explanation of the
rational basis standard in footnote 27 in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27
(2008), applies to due process as well as equal protection).
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irrationality simply did not rise to the level of constitutional
violations.169 As Chief Justice Roberts concluded, the discretionary
and subjective nature of government employment decisions excluded
them from constitutional protection under the class-of-one theory.170
Lower courts have indicated that his analysis may apply beyond
employment cases.171
The potentially radical nature of Engquist’s analysis makes it
important to consider its status as constitutional law. In particular,
it requires us to examine whether, under Engquist, class-of-one
discrimination in government employment simply does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause or whether equal protection violations
in such cases do exist but are so rare that it makes no sense for
courts to enforce against them via rationality review. This distinc-
tion, as academic as it might sound,172 matters for at least two
reasons. First, if judicial doctrine—here, the exclusion of such
claims from equal protection review—does not exhaust the constitu-
tional command, then at least a theoretical case could be made for
congressional enforcement power to fill in the gap left by judicial
underenforcement of that command.173 Second, and by contrast, if
rational basis review does in fact exhaust the underlying constitu-
tional command, then we need to rethink our basic assumption that
American constitutionalism prohibits arbitrary or irrational
government action or indeed whether it even prohibits government
action motivated by purely personal gain.174
169. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 3, at 264 (describing Engquist as stating that “subjective
and individualized decisions, which Chief Justice Roberts identified as within the exercise of
broad discretion, simply cannot be cabined even by a requirement that they be rational”).
170. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 605 (2008).
171. See supra notes 77-82 (citing lower court decisions applying Engquist beyond the
government employment context).
172. Cf. Powell, supra note 3, at 234 (“The obvious question ... is whether there is anything
more than theoretical significance to the fact that constitutional doctrine is characterized by
the admitted doctrinal gap between its content and the Constitution’s direct commands.”).
173. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal
Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 570-71, 576-77 (2005) (discussing the opening that the
nonexhaustive character of rational basis review provides for congressional enforcement
power).
174. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 61 (2001) (“[T]he
American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not necessarily
linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly arbitrary legislation.”);
see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the funda-
mental nature of the rule against government action in pursuit of purely private interests).
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At least Justice Scalia, one of the members of the Engquist
majority, reads that case as reflecting all that the Constitution
requires, quite apart from courts’ institutional incapacity to enforce
a stricter command. In his opinion for the Court in District of
Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 case holding that the Second
Amendment protected a personal right to possess firearms,175 he
wrote in a footnote that rational basis review, rather than constitut-
ing simply a level of judicial scrutiny, itself exhausted the constitu-
tional command in cases in which it applied.176 Notably, he cited
Engquist as an example of the full extent and force of the Equal
Protection Clause.177 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, Engquist’s
exclusion of some discrimination claims from any equal protection
review reflects core constitutional meaning—a meaning that
provides no protection at all for class-of-one government employee-
plaintiffs or presumably others who can be analogized to them.178
Professor Powell has suggested that this distinction also matters for purposes of the
application of stare decisis. See Powell, supra note 3, at 235.
175. 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
176. See id. at 628 n.27 (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008))
(“Justice Breyer correctly notes that [the challenged gun control] law, like almost all laws,
would pass rational-basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have
used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions
on irrational laws. In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the
very substance of the constitutional guarantee.”). For an early, necessarily thumbnail
discussion of footnote 27, see William D. Araiza, Judicial Supremacy in a Footnote?,
PRAWFSBLAWG  (May 12, 2009), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/judicial-
supremacy-in-a-footnote. html. For a subsequent comprehensive and scholarly discussion of
footnote 27, see generally Powell, supra note 3.
177. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see also Powell, supra note 3, at 262-63.
178. In theory it might be possible to read footnote 27 as simply reiterating the fact that
in most cases equal protection requires that the challenged government action be rational,
without reading that footnote as simultaneously enshrining the judicially developed rational
basis standard, with all its presumptions and allocations of proof burdens, as itself stating
core constitutional meaning. Such a reading would render that footnote consistent with an
approach to judicial doctrine in which a judicial review standard is not understood as
necessarily reflecting the full extent of relevant constitutional meaning. Cf. Powell, supra note
3, at 222 (noting the possibility of a “doctrinal gap” between constitutional meaning and
judicial doctrine); Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004)
(discussing the gap concept more generally). However, such a reading of footnote 27 is
implausible. Rather, in footnote 27 Justice Scalia explicitly equates judicial scrutiny under
the rational basis standard with the Constitution’s requirement of government rationality.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (citation omitted) (“[W]hen evaluating laws under
constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws ... ‘rational basis’
is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee.”).
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The correctness and ultimate staying power of Justice Scalia’s
understanding of Engquist presents a question with high stakes.
Professor H. Jefferson Powell, remarking on Justice Scalia’s Heller
footnote and its citation to Engquist, postulates that it creates an
increased space for politics at the expense of law—that is, an
increased realm for purely discretionary decisions, unrestrained by
legal requirements such as equal protection and due process.179
Although such a realm has always existed,180 its extension to a
potentially broad range of day-to-day government decision making
constitutes an innovation—and a troubling one, given the lack of
clear and effective political accountability over such decisions.181
This concern takes on concrete form when one realizes how lower
courts are applying Engquist to a variety of types of government
action.182
Citing Engquist as authority for this innovation is doubly
troubling for the fabric of equal protection law because that case
involved animus, not simply “innocent irrationality.”183 Engquist’s
exclusion of some animus-motivated government action from equal
protection’s concern throws into question the centrality of animus
179. See Powell, supra note 3, at 258-59.
180. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803) (recognizing the
existence of nonreviewable discretionary power in the executive branch).
181. By contrast one might note how narrowly the Court has construed the Administrative
Procedure Act’s provision under which agency actions are exempt from judicial review by
virtue of being “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (explaining that that provision is
“narrow,” and applies only when laws are written in such broad terms that there is “no law
to apply”); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599 (1988) (applying the “no law to apply” formula).
Perhaps notably, in Webster Justice Scalia wrote separately to advocate for a broader
understanding of the “committed to agency discretion by law” exception to judicial review.
Webster, 486 U.S. at 606-11 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the APA exception for actions “committed to agency discretion by law” extends beyond
situations in which there is no law to apply); see also Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial
Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV.
2029, 2056, 2062 (2011) (noting the existence of statutory interpretation canons limiting what
would otherwise be grants of broad agency discretion).
182. See supra notes 76-84 (citing those lower court cases).
183. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., No. Civ.02-1637-AS, 2004 WL 2066748, at *5 (D.
Or. Sept. 14, 2004) (noting that the plaintiff’s theory of her class-of-one claim required her to
prove “that she was singled out as a result of animosity” on the part of the government
official-defendants), rev’d, 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 591 (2008); see also
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 595-96 (stating the same). The jury eventually found for her on that
claim. See id. at 596.
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in equal protection law.184 In turn, Heller’s highlighting of Engquist
as an exemplar of “the very substance of the constitutional guaran-
tee”185 provided by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses186
reinforces the view that Engquist demarcates the Constitution’s
actual outer limit, rather than simply the limit of competent judicial
enforcement. The result is a Constitution that leaves citizens
explicitly and unambiguously vulnerable to government action
motivated by undeniably illegitimate goals.
So understood, Engquist fails equal protection in two distinct
senses. In addition to “failing” it in the sense of reaching results
inconsistent with other components of equal protection doctrine,187
Engquist also “fails” equal protection by abandoning its deepest
commitments. These two failures are, of course, closely related.
Equal protection doctrine, as intricate as it might be, ultimately
seeks to honor the fundamental requirement that government not
classify except reasonably and in pursuit of a public purpose.188
Institutional difficulties may keep courts from fully enforcing that
guarantee, a phenomenon that is largely responsible for the Court’s
application of mediating rules such as Carolene’s tiered-scrutiny
structure.189 Such difficulties may also lead the Court to create other
doctrinal rules, such as the burden-shifting structure that is part of
its intent doctrine190 and even the intent requirement itself.191 But
they all seek to implement equal protection’s basic command. 
If the Court had wished, it could have taken the same approach
in Engquist. By insisting that plaintiffs provide proof of animus or
some other private motivation, the Court could have cut directly to
184. For one attempt to explain the role of animus, see Pollvogt, supra note 2, at 937.
185. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
186. Of course, in some cases equal protection and due process may require more than
either rationality or the rational basis standard of judicial review. For example, race
classifications receive strict scrutiny. In footnote 27, Justice Scalia made clear that he was
referring to the rational basis standard as all the Constitution requires in cases in which
courts apply that standard. See id.
187. See supra Part II (explaining how Engquist is in tension with the Court’s
understanding of doctrinal concepts such as discriminatory intent and animus).
188. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
189. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
190. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
(setting forth this structure).
191. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (suggesting the decisional-rule nature
of the intent requirement).
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the requirement that marks equal protection’s foundational
principle. Indeed, it could have gone even farther and imposed a
litigation rule analogous to the intent requirement’s burden-shifting
structure,192 insisting that animus be pled with some specificity.
Just as with the traditional understanding of rational basis
scrutiny, such a doctrinal requirement would have likely resulted in
the rejection of at least some meritorious claims.193 Nevertheless,
that cost might be justifiable in light of the difficulties posed by
judicial attempts to enforce the anti-animus rule to its full extent. 
But by outright excluding a category of class-of-one claims that
otherwise would be meritorious under equal protection’s core public-
purpose requirement, the Court has gone far beyond adopting a
decision rule that seeks to implement a constitutional requirement.
Instead, as Professor Powell has suggested, it has altered that
constitutional requirement.194 This subtle shift may not yield
radically different results. Nor are those results necessarily
problematic. As this Article has stated several times, class-of-one
claims should be very difficult for plaintiffs to win and, indeed,
perhaps somewhat challenging even to plead.195 But demarcating a
subset of such claims as formally outside the boundaries of equal
protection inevitably tears at our understanding of the minimum
requirements the Constitution imposes on government action.
Before Engquist, the Constitution was generally understood to
require that government action aim at promoting the public good.
After Engquist that is not so obvious.
The implications of this doctrinal tear are not clear at this early
stage. But that uncertainty gives no reason to be sanguine. Already,
a majority of the Court in Heller has more explicitly endorsed the
idea, only implicit in Engquist, that the Constitution countenances
government action taken with the avowed aim of serving the
official’s private interests.196 Heller’s endorsement of that idea
increases its force, by virtue of the fact that it now appears as a bald
192. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
193. Cf. Powell, supra note 3, at 246 (suggesting that the statute upheld in the
paradigmatic equal protection rational basis case, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955), quite possibly reflected simple rent-seeking by private parties).
194. See id. at 260-61.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 113-17.
196. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
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proposition in Supreme Court case law, torn from the surrounding
context and potential limitations of the reasoning in Engquist
itself.197 This situation creates a troubling potential for doctrinal
“mission creep.” As Justice Jackson warned nearly seventy years
ago in another troubling, but much better known, equality case, a
principle announced in a judicial opinion takes on a life of its own.198
Indeed, as he further warned, such a principle has its own “genera-
tive power,” molding future doctrine to fit it,199 and “expand[ing]
itself to the limit of its logic.”200 
That expansion has already begun. As noted earlier, some lower
courts have already read Engquist broadly, relying on it to exclude
additional varieties of class-of-one claims from constitutional
protection.201 Heller footnote 27, by explicitly conferring upon the
Engquist principle the status of constitutional law, has laid the
groundwork for further expansion. That expansion may not be
limited to class-of-one cases. Rather, one can at least conceive of
courts reading Engquist and footnote 27 together as casting doubt
on any equal protection analysis that rests on conclusions about
animus. Such an expansion could well aggravate the rip Engquist
created in the fabric of equal protection law. Explicitly animus-
based analysis may well become more prominent in future equal
protection doctrine as the Court continues to eschew reliance on
Carolene-style suspect-class analysis in favor of a more direct
examination of a classification’s reasonableness and public
purpose.202 This evolution may accelerate as the Court confronts
197. This Article has, of course, criticized that reasoning. See generally supra Part II.
Nevertheless, Engquist did suggest limits on the scope of the opinion. See, e.g., Engquist v.
Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 607 (2008) (explicitly limiting its holding to government
employment); infra text accompanying notes 206-07 (suggesting that its analysis is based on
institutional and prudential concerns rather than constitutional commands).
198. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 246 (“[A]ll that [an announced legal principle] creates will be in its own image.”).
200. Id. (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)).
201. See supra notes 76-84.
202. It bears noting that the Court has not performed a serious suspect class analysis in
nearly thirty years, since City of Cleburne. Yet during that time it has struck down laws as
failing equal protection rational basis scrutiny, largely based on conclusions about animus.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013)  (concluding that the challenged
provision of the Defense of Marriage Act reflected unconstitutional animus and thus violated
the equality guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (concluding that the challenged state law reflected animus against the
burdened group); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
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emerging claims of discrimination that fit uneasily within the
standard suspect class template.203 If Engquist and Heller combine
to provide a countervailing doctrinal tug away from a focus on
animus, the resulting stress could cause a serious tear. Of course,
it remains to be seen whether Engquist and Heller will provide that
tug. But if they do, it would not be the first time that dicta and
imprecise reasoning in a seemingly minor case yielded unforeseen
and unintended results.204 
At least for now, however, Engquist need not be read as reflecting
such a limited underlying meaning of equal protection. Thus, the
troubling understanding of Engquist that Heller endorsed as core
constitutional meaning remains open to reconsideration.
concurring) (applying an explicitly more searching version of equal protection rational basis
scrutiny based on the law’s apparent “desire to harm a politically unpopular group”); Araiza,
supra note 166 (describing Windsor’s particularized focus on animus); see also supra note 166
(discussing Windsor). It has also modulated the effective level of scrutiny for a given type of
classification based on the Court’s understanding of whether the classification reflected real
differences or inaccurate stereotypes. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542
(1996) (strongly suggesting that, as long as one woman could succeed at and benefit from the
unique pedagogical program at a state military school, the school’s sex discriminatory
admissions policy was insufficiently-precisely tailored), with Tuan Ahn Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 62-63 (2001) (accepting as adequate generalizations about the different intensity of
the contact a mother and father would likely have with a child). During this period the Court
has also come close to dismissing the relevance of political process theory to the level of
scrutiny to be accorded race classifications. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 495-96 (1989). This abandonment of suspect class analysis has not gone unnoticed by
lower courts, whose equal protection cases have turned more and more on direct examination
of the law’s reasonableness and public purpose. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093-
95 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking down California’s reinstitution of its ban on same-sex marriage
as reflecting simple and illegitimate disapproval of same-sex couples and gays and lesbians).
203. See, e.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1997) (considering obesity
discrimination); cf. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-08 (D.D.C. 2008)
(considering transgender discrimination in a statutory context); Jessica Roberts, Preempting
Discrimination: Lessons From the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 439, 488 (2010) (considering the constitutional status of genetic discrimination). See
generally William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power
to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451 (2010) (discussing the
challenges new types of equal protection claims pose to standard equal protection doctrine).
204. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005) (correcting a quarter-
century long mistake in takings law derived from “simple repetition of a phrase” that over
time became “ensconced” in the Court’s takings jurisprudence); see also Simon & Schuster v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Court’s Speech Clause rule according strict scrutiny to
content-based laws originated in an equal protection case that involved speech, and critiquing
that borrowing as having occurred “by accident”).
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Concededly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Engquist does
attempt to explain why the type of decision at issue in the govern-
ment employment context does not implicate equal protection
concerns. His description of Olech as a case involving a clear
standard against which the government’s action could be tested, and
his contrasting description of employment decisions as necessarily
involving discretionary and subjective judgments,205 suggests an
argument that the latter type of decision simply does not fit within
the template of decisions susceptible to a requirement of equal
treatment of similarly-situated persons. Yet at other times his
Engquist opinion suggests an alternative, prudential, and institu-
tional competence-based understanding of the Court’s result. For
example, he relied on the availability of other legal protections for
government employees as a justification for excluding them from
protection under the class-of-one doctrine.206 At one point he
explicitly, and colorfully, analogized meritorious class-of-one
employment claims to needles in haystacks.207 Taking the Chief
Justice at his word, it must be that such meritorious
claims—“needles”—exist, at least as a theoretical matter.208
Thus, the way is still open for the Court to reconsider its under-
standing of Engquist. An alternative reading remains open, in which
government employment class-of-one claims are acknowledged as
conceptually possible but are deemed simply too difficult, intrusive,
and unnecessary for courts to resolve as matters of constitutional
law.209 Adoption of this alternative reading would go a long way
toward squelching Heller footnote 27 and mitigating the damage it
otherwise causes to our traditional constitutional understandings,
by recognizing the existence of what Professor Powell calls the
205. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601-03 (2008).
206. See id. at 606-07. In this sense the Chief Justice’s analysis begins to resemble the
more straightforwardly pragmatic approach to the class-of-one doctrine taken by Judge
Richard Posner. See generally Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues:
Doctrine, Discourse, and Judicial Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D.
L. REV. 197, 197-203 (2013) (contrasting the formalism of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in
Engquist with the explicitly pragmatic approach taken in class-of-one cases by Judge Posner).
207. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 608.
208. See Araiza, supra note 49, at 61.
209. Cf. Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 898 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that
some class-of-one claims were unnecessary, to the extent other legal remedies would be
available for the plaintiff).
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“doctrinal gap”210 between constitutional meaning and judicial
doctrine—a gap footnote 27 denies. Finally, footnote 27 itself should
not be understood as announcing the Court’s considered judgment
denying the existence of that gap. As a footnoted response to a sec-
ondary argument posed by a dissent, its radical reconceptualization
of basic constitutional guarantees should not be accepted as the
Court’s authoritative and binding wisdom on this fundamental
question. The Court understands Congress not to hide elephants in
mouseholes;211 it should understand its own handiwork similarly. 
Indeed, even as footnote 27 and Engquist together purport to
announce an extreme and formalistic revision of the role rationality
and public purpose play in American constitutionalism, lower courts
have continued their struggle to craft a class-of-one doctrine that
recognizes the traditional understanding of those concepts.212
Among the exemplars of that ongoing work are the opinions in Del
Marcelle, which, in their critical reception to both Olech’s dismissal
of animus and Engquist’s seeming exclusion of law enforcement
class-of-one claims, reflect a healthy skepticism about overreading
the Court’s statements on those issues.213 One can only hope that
lower courts will continue resisting the urge to take those state-
ments, and Heller footnote 27, too literally and instead continue
developing creative, appropriate methods for cabining class-of-one
litigation, while still honoring both equal protection doctrine and
principle. 
If lower courts continue that work, then perhaps eventually the
Supreme Court may acknowledge the lessons of their nuanced
experimentation as superior to its own veering from a wooden over
enthusiasm about the class-of-one doctrine in Olech to an equally
wooden over skepticism in Engquist. In particular, perhaps the
Court could go beyond the reinterpretation of Engquist suggested
above,214 and explicitly hold that a plaintiff in any context can bring
a class-of-one claim, as long as she satisfies judge-made proof and
pleading requirements that appropriately cabin litigation, settle-
210. Powell, supra note 3, at 222.
211. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress
... does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
212. See supra Part I.B.
213. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
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ment, and mistaken-liability costs. If the Court fails to seriously
engage with the creative thinking lower courts have done about how
to cabin such claims without undermining basic constitutional
commitments, then it will continue to flunk the class-of-one. Even
more tragically, it will continue to fail equal protection and, with it,
the American constitutional tradition.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes back entrances provide the easiest access to a
structure. Equal protection law has featured heated debates about
animus, the intent requirement, and other foundational issues.215
Those debates are illuminated by a focus on the doctrinal back
entrance that is the class-of-one.216 This Article’s discussion of the
class-of-one doctrine illuminates the role played by intent; even
more clearly, it highlights the centrality of the public purpose
requirement and, by extension, the concepts of animus and rational-
ity. 
If this Article is correct in arguing that Engquist risks undermin-
ing the public purpose requirement, then the class-of-one doctrine
becomes important as more than just a back entrance into the
structure of equal protection law. In that case, Engquist’s miscon-
ceived cut-back on the class-of-one would also, to mix metaphors,
constitute a latent construction defect; indeed, thanks to Heller
footnote 27, that defect would threaten the entire structure. The fact
that Engquist’s overbroad cut-back was likely triggered by Olech’s
similarly mistaken overbroad endorsement of that same doctrine
only adds irony to the tragedy. It is time for the Court to begin
repairing its shoddy workmanship. Sadly, up until now it has shown
no inclination to do so.217
215. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
216. See supra Part II (explaining how the class-of-one illuminates the concepts of
discriminatory intent and animus). Other issues it touches on include the existence and
implications of the distinction between constitutional law and judicial decision rules in equal
protection, see supra text accompanying note 206, and the role comparators play and should
play in equal protection analysis, see supra note 117.
217. The Court denied certiorati in Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp. in November 2012.
133 S. Ct. 654 (2012).
